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In artificial intelligence, multi agent systems constitute an interesting typology of society modeling,
and have in this regard vast fields of application, which extend to the human sciences. Logic is
often used to model such kind of systems as it is easier to verify than other approaches, and provides
explainability and potential validation. In this paper we define a time module suitable to add time to
many logic representations of agents.
1 Introduction
In the literature there different kind of timed logical frameworks exist, where time is specified directly
using hybrid logics (cf., e.g., [2]), temporal epistemic logic (cf., e.g., [4]) or simply by using Linear
Temporal Logic. We propose a temporal module which can be adopted to “temporalize” many logical
framework. This module is in practice a particular kind of function that assigns a “timing” to atoms.
We have exploited this T function in two different settings. The first one is the formalization of the
reasoning on the formation of beliefs and the interaction with background knowledge in non-omniscient
agents’ memory. Memory in an agent system is in fact a process of reasoning: in particular, it is the
learning process of strengthening a concept. In fact, through memory an agent is potentially able to
recall and to learn from experiences so that its beliefs and its future course of action are grounded in
these experiences. Most of the methods to design agent memorization mechanisms have been inspired by
models of human memory [10, 8] developed in cognitive science. In computational logic, [3] introduces
DLEK (Dynamic Logic of Explicit beliefs and Knowledge) as a logical formalization of SOAR (State
Operator And Result) Architecture [7], which is one of the most popular cognitive architectures. The
underlying idea is to represent reasoning about the formation of beliefs through perception and inference
in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents. They consider perception, short-term memory (also called
“working memory”), long-term memory (also called “background knowledge”) and their interaction.
DLEK is a logic that consists of a static part called LEK (Logic of Explicit beliefs and Knowledge), which
is an epistemic logic, and a dynamic component, which extends the static one with “mental operations”.
Resource-boundedness in DLEK is modeled via the assumption that beliefs are kept in the short-term
memory, while implications that allow reasoning to be performed are kept in the long-term memory. New
beliefs can be formed in DLEK either from perception, or from previous beliefs in short-term memories
and rules in the background knowledge. Inferences that add new beliefs are performed one step at a
time via an interaction between short- and long-term memories in consequence of an explicit “mental
operation” that will occur whenever an agent deems it necessary and can allot the needed time [1, 5].
The second setting is a logical framework for reasoning about agents cognitive attitudes; many formal
logics have been proposed for reasoning about concepts taken from qualitative decision theory. Lorini in
[9] proposes a general logical framework for reasoning about agents cognitive attitudes of both epistemic
type and motivational type.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic very simple definition of
the time function T. In Sections 3-4 we discuss the introduction of T in the logics mentioned above. In
Section 5 we propose a brief discussion on complexity and on future work and conclude.
2 The time function T
In this section we introduce the “time” function T that associates to each formula the time interval in
which this formula is true. To this aim, we assume that each atom has two arguments representing
time instants. For the sake of simplicity, as we concentrate on these arguments, we ignore all the other
arguments; i.e., we assume each atom to be of the form p(t1, t2).
• T (p(t1, t2)) = [t1, t2], which stands for “p is true in the time interval [t1, t2]” where t1, t2 ∈ N; as
a special case we have T (p(t1, t1)) = t1, which stands for “p is true in the time instant t1” where
t1 ∈ N (time instant);
• T (¬p(t1, t2)) = [t1, t2], which stands for “p is not true in the time interval [t1, t2]” where t1, t2 ∈ N;
• T (ϕ op ψ) = T (ϕ)
⊎
T (ψ) with op ∈ {∨,∧,→}, which means the unique smallest interval in-
cluding both T (ϕ) and T (ψ).
This basic definition, although simple, is able to incorporate a concept of time in virtually any logical
formalism by creating a link between syntax ans semantics, as we show below via two relevant examples.
Naturally, the T function must then be customized to accommodate the operations which are proper of
the ’host’ formalism.
3 Time Logic of Explicit Belief and Knowledge and Dynamic Logic of
Explicit beliefs and Knowledge
As in [3], our logic consists of two different components: a static component, called T-LEK, which is a
mix between an Epistemic Logic and Metric Temporal Logic ([6]), and a dynamic component, called T-
DLEK, which extends the static one with mental operations, which are very important for “controlling”
beliefs (addition of belief, update of existing belief, etc.).
3.1 T-LEK and T-DLEK Syntax
In our scenario we fix Atm = {p(t1, t2),q(t3, t4), ... ,h(ti, t j)} where ti 6 t j and p,q,h are predicates, that
can be equal or not. Moreover p(t1, t2) stands for “p is true from the time instant t1 to t2” with t1, t2 ∈ N
(Temporal Representation of the external world); as a special case we can have p(t1, t1) which stands
for “p is true in the time instant t1”. Obviously we can have predicates with more terms tha only two
but in that case we fix that the first two must be those that identify the time duration of the belief (i.e.
open(1,3,door) which means “the agent knows that the door is open from time one to time 3”). Let also
Agt be a finite set of agents.
Below is the definition of the formulas of the language LT-LEK with i ∈ Agt:
ϕ ,ψ := p(t1, t2) | ¬ϕ | I ϕ | Bi ϕ | Kiϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ → ψ
Others Boolean connectives ⊤, ⊥, ↔ are defined from ¬ and ∧ as usual. In the formula I Φ the
MTL Interval “always” operator is applied to a formula. The operator Bi is intended to denote belief
and the operator Ki to denote knowledge. More precisely Bi identifies beliefs present in the working
342 A Temporal Module for Logical Frameworks
memory, instead Ki identifies what rules present in the background knowledge. The language LT-DLEK
of Temporalized DLEK (T-DLEK) is obtained by augmenting LT−LEK with the expression [α ]ψ , where
α denotes a mental operation and ψ is a ground formula. The mental operations that we consider are
essentially the same as in [3]:
• +ϕ , where ϕ is a ground formula of the form p(t1, t2) or ¬p(t1, t2): the mental operation that
serves to form a new belief from a perception ϕ .
• ∩(ϕ ,ψ): believing both ϕ and ψ , an agent starts believing their conjunction.
• ⊢(ϕ ,ψ), where ψ is a ground atom, say p(t1, t2): an agent, believing that ϕ is true and having
in its long-term memory that ϕ implies ψ (in some suitable time interval including [t1, t2]), starts
believing that p(t1, t2) is true.
• ⊣(ϕ ,ψ) where ϕ and ψ are ground atoms, say p(t1, t2) and q(t3, t4) respectively: an agent, believ-
ing p(t1, t2) and having in the long-term memory that p(t1, t2) implies ¬q(t3, t4), removes the timed
belief q(t3, t4) if the intervals match. Notice that, should q be believed in a wider interval I such
that [t1, t2] ⊆ I, the belief q(., .) is removed concerning intervals [t1, t2] and [t3, t4], but it is left for
the remaining sub-intervals (so, it is “restructured”).
3.2 T-LEK and T-DLEK Semantics
Semantics of DLEK and T-DLEK are both based on a setW of worlds. In both DLEK and T-DLEK we
have the valuation function: V :W → 2Atm. Also, extend the definition of the “time” function T :
• T (Biϕ) = T (ϕ);
• T (Kiϕ) = T (ϕ);
• T (Iϕ) = I where I is a time interval in N;
• T ([α ]ϕ) there are different cases depends on which kind of mental operations we applied:
1. T (+ϕ) = T (ϕ);
2. T (∩(ϕ ,ψ)) = T (ϕ)
⊎
T (ψ);
3. T (⊢(ϕ ,ψ)) = T (ψ);
4. T (⊣(ϕ ,ψ)) returns the restored interval where ψ is true.
For a world w, let t1 the minimum time instant of T (p(t1, t1)) where p(t1, t1) ∈ V (w) and let t2 be the
supremum time instant (we can have t2 = ∞) among the atoms in V (w). Then, whenever useful, we
denote w as wI where I = [t1, t2], which identifies the world in a given interval.
The notion of LEK/T-LEK model does not consider mental operations, discussed later, and is intro-
duced by the following definition.
Definition 3.1 A T-LEK model is a tuple M = 〈W ;Ni;Ri;V ;T 〉 with i ∈ Agt where:
• W is the set of worlds;
• V :W → 2Atm is the valuation function;
• T is the “time” function;
• Ri ⊆W×W is the accessibility relation, required to be an equivalence relation so as to model
omniscience in the background knowledge s.t. Ri(w) = {v ∈W | wIRi vI} called epistemic state of
the agent i in wI , which indicates all the situations that the agent i considers possible in the world
wI or, equivalently any situation the agent i can retrieve from long-term memory based on what it
knows in world wI;
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• Ni :W → 2
2W is a “neighbourhood” function, ∀wI ∈W, N(i,wI) defines, in terms of sets of worlds,
what the agent i is allowed to explicitly believe in the world wI; ∀wI,vI ∈W, and X ⊆W:
1. if X ∈ N(i,wI), then X ⊆ Ri(wI): each element of the neighbourhood is a set composed of
reachable worlds;
2. if wIRi vI , then N(i,wI) ⊆ N(i,vI): if the world vI is compliant with the epistemic state of
world wI , then the agent i in the world wI should have a subset of beliefs of the world vI .
A preliminary definition before the Truth conditions : let M = 〈W ;Ni;Ri;V ;T 〉 a T-LEK model.
Given a formula ϕ , for every wI ∈W , we define
‖ ϕ ‖MwI= {vI ∈W |M,vI |= ϕ}∩Ri(wI).
Truth conditions for T-DLEK formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• M,wI |= p(t1, t2) iff p(t1, t2) ∈V (wI) and T (p(t1, t2))⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ¬ϕ iff M,wI 2 ϕ and T (¬ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M,wI |= ϕ and M,wI |= ψ with T (ϕ),T (ψ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ϕ ∨ψ iff M,wI |= ϕ or M,wI |= ψ with T (ϕ),T (ψ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ϕ → ψ iff M,wI 2 ϕ or M,wI |= ψ with T (ϕ),T (ψ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= Biϕ iff ‖ ϕ ‖
M
wI
∈ N(wI) and T (ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= Kiϕ iff for all vI ∈ Ri(wI), it holds that M,vI |= ϕ and T (ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |=Jϕ iff T (ϕ)⊆ J ⊆ I and for all vI ∈ Ri(wI), it holds that M,vI |= ϕ ;
Concerning a mental operation α performed by any agent i, we have: M,wI |= [α ]ϕ iff M
α
,wI |= ϕ
and T (ϕ) ⊆ I where Mα = 〈W ;Nα(i,wI);Ri;V ;T 〉. Here α represents a mental operation affecting the
sets of beliefs. In particular, such operation can add new beliefs by direct perception, by means of one
inference step, or as a conjunction of previous beliefs. When introducing new beliefs, the neighbourhood
must be extended accordingly, as seen below; in particular, the new neighbourhood Nα(i,wI) is defined
for each of the mental operations as follows.
• Learning perceived belief:
N+ϕ(i,wI) = N(i,wI) ∪
{
‖ ϕ ‖MwI
}
with T (ϕ)⊆ I.
The agent i adds to its beliefs perception ϕ (namely, an atom or the negation of an atom) perceived
at a time in T (ϕ); the neighbourhood is expanded to as to include the set composed of all the
reachable worlds which entail ϕ in M.
• Beliefs conjunction:
N∩(ψ ,χ)(i,wI) =


N(i,wI) ∪
{
‖ ψ ∧ χ ‖MwI
}
if M,wI |= Bi(ψ)∧Bi(χ)
and T (∩(ψ ,χ))⊆ I
N(i,wI) otherwise
The agent i adds ψ ∧ χ as a belief if it has among its previous beliefs both ψ and χ , with I
including all time instants referred to by them; otherwise the set of beliefs remain unchanged. The
neighbourhood is expanded, if the operation succeeds, with those sets of reachable worlds where
both formulas are entailed inM.
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• Belief inference:
N⊢(ψ ,χ)(i,wI) =


N(wI) ∪
{
‖ χ ‖MwI
}
if M,wI |= Bi(ψ) ∧ Ki(ψ → χ)
and T (⊢ (ψ ,χ))⊆ I
N(wI) otherwise
The agent i adds the ground atom χ as a belief in its short-term memory if it has ψ among its
previous beliefs and has in its background knowledge Ki(ψ → χ), where all the time stamps
occurring in ψ and in χ belong to I. Observe that, if I does not include all time instants involved
in the formulas, the operation does not succeed and thus the set of beliefs remains unchanged. If
the operation succeeds then the neighbourhood is modified by adding χ as a new belief.
• Beliefs revision (applied only on ground atoms).
Given Q= q( j,k) s.t. T (q( j,k)) = T (q(t1, t2))∩T (q(t3, t4)) with j,k ∈ N and
P=
{
M,wI |= Bi(p(t1, t2))∧Bi(q(t3, t4))∧Ki(p(t1, t2)→¬q(t3, t4)) and T (⊣ (p(t1, t2),
q(t3, t4)))⊆ I and there is no interval J ) T (p(t1, t2)) s.t. Bi(q(t5, t6)) where
T (q(t5, t6))=J
}
:
N⊣(p(t1,t2),q(t3,t4))(i,wI) =
{
N(i,wI)\
{
‖ Q ‖MwI
}
if P
N(i,wI) otherwise
The agent i believes that q(t3, t4) holds only in the interval T (q(t3, t4)) and has the perception
of p(t1, t2) where T (p(t1, t2)) ⊆ T (q(t3, t4)). Then, the agent i replaces previous belief q(t3, t4)
in the short-term memory with q(t5, t6) where T (q(t5, t6))=T (q(t3, t4)) \T (q(t1, t2)). In general,
the set T (q(t3, t4)) \ T (q(t1, t2)) is not necessarily an interval: being T (p(t1, t2)) ⊆ T (q(t3, t4)),
with T (p(t1, t2))=[t1, t2], and T (q(t3, t4))=[t3, t4], we have that T (q(t3, t4)) \ T (q(t1, t2))=[t3, t1−
1]∪[t2+1, t4]. Thus, q(t3, t4) is replaced by q(t3, t1−1) and q(t2+1, t4) (and similarly if t4 = ∞).
4 Temporal Dynamic Logic of Cognitive Attitudes
The Temporal Dynamic Logic of Cognitive Attitudes (T-DLCA) is an extension of Dynamic Logic of
Cognitive Attitudes (DLCA), presented in [9]. In our extension we introduce the concept of time through
a particular function that assigns a “timing” to knowledge, belief, strong belief, conditional belief, desire,
strong desire, comparative desirability and choice.
4.1 T-DLCA Syntax
In our scenario we fix Atm= {p(t1, t2),q(t3, t4), ... ,h(ti, t j)} as in T-LEK framework. Let Nom= {x(t1),
y(t2), , ... ,z(t j)} where x,y,z are nominals, which name individual states in models, where t j are time
instants where j ∈ N. Moreover Nom is disjoint from Atm and let Agt be a finite set of agent.
Below is the definition the language LTDLCA where i ∈ Agt, p(t1, t2) ∈ Atm and x(t) ∈ Nom:
pi,λ := ≡i | i,P | i,D | 
∼
i,P | 
∼
i,D | pi;λ | pi ∪λ | pi ∩λ | −pi | ϕ?
ϕ ,ψ := p(t1, t2) | x(t)| ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ψ | [pi]ϕ
Others Boolean connectives⊤,⊥,↔ are defined from ¬ and ∧ as usual. Moreover pi represents programs
which is the basic construct of Dynamic Logic, we can called them Cognitive Programs to underline
that we are working on reasoning about agents cognitive attitudes; in fact pi corresponds to a particular
configuration of agents cognitive states. As in DL pi;λ stands for “do pi followed by λ”, pi ∪λ stands
for “do pi or λ”, pi ∩λ stands for “do pi and λ”, −pi is the inverse, ϕ? stands for “proceed if ϕ is true,
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else fail”; instead ≡i, i,P, i,D describe agents knowledge, plausibility and desirability respectively,
and ∼i,P, 
∼
i,D are the complements of i,P, i,D. Also the formula [pi]ϕ has to be read “ϕ is true,
according to the program pi”; obviously we have different meanings based on the pi we choose, first of all
[≡i]ϕ which stands for “ϕ is true according to what agent i knows”, [
∼
i,P]ϕ which stands for “ϕ is true
at all states that, according to agent i, are at least as plausible as the current one” while [∼i,P]ϕ stands
for “ϕ is true at all states that, according to agent i, are not at least as plausible as the current one”. For
i,D and 
∼
i,D it is enough to replace plausible with desirable in the definition.
4.2 T-DLCA Semantic
Semantic of T-DLCA is based on a setW of worlds, we have the valuation function: V :W → 2Atm∪Nom.
We extend the “time” function T as follows:
• T (x(t)) = t
• T ([pi]ϕ) = T (ϕ).
Definition 4.1 A T-DLCA model is a tuple M = 〈W ;(i,P)i∈Agt ;(i,D)i∈Agt ;(≡i)i∈Agt ;
R;V ;T 〉 where:
• W is the set of worlds defined as in the previous setting;
• for every i ∈ Agt, i,P and i,D are preorders on W and ≡i is an equivalence relation on W such
that for all τ ∈ P,D and for all wI,vJ ∈W:
1. i,τ⊆≡i which means that an agent can only compare the plausibility or the desirability of
two states, this states have to be in the same interval I;
2. if wI ≡i vJ then wI i,τ vJ or wI i,τ vJ with I = J which means that the plausibility or the
desirability of two states are always comparable if this states are in the same interval I;
• V :W → 2Atm∪Nom is the valuation function and for all wI,vJ ∈W and VNom(wI) = Nom∩V(wI):
1. VNom(wI) 6=∅;
2. if VNom(wI)∪VNom(vJ) 6=∅ then wI = vJ with I = J;
• T is the “time” function;
• Rpi ⊆W×W is a binary relation which works in the following way based on pi:
1. wIR≡ivI iff wI ≡i vI;
2. wIRi,τvI iff wI i,τ vI;
3. wi
∼
i,τvI iff wI ≡i vI and wI i,τ vI;
4. wIRpi;λ vI iff ∃zI ∈W : wIRpizI and zIRλvI;
5. wIRpi∩λ vI iff wIRpivI or wIRλ vI;
6. wIRpi∪λ vI iff wIRpivI and wIRλvI;
7. wIR−pivI iff vIRpiwI .
The properties ot the valuation function capture the basic properties of nominals: the uniqueness in
associating a single nominal with a state.
Truth conditions for T-DLCA formulas are defined inductively as follows:
• M,wI |= p(t1, t2) iff p(t1, t2) ∈V (wI) and T (p(t1, t2))⊆ I;
• M,wI |= x(t) iff x(t) ∈V (wI) and T (x(t)) ⊆ I;
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• M,wI |= ¬ϕ iff M,wI 2 ϕ and T (¬ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M,wI |= ϕ and M,wI |= ψ with T (ϕ),T (ψ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= [pi]ϕ iff ∀vI ∈W : if wIRpivI then M,vI |= ϕ with T ([pi]ϕ)⊆ I;
• M,wI |= [?ϕ ]ϕ iff ∀vI ∈W : if wIR?ϕvI thenM,vI |=ϕ with T ([?ϕ ]ϕ)⊆ I where wIR?ϕvI iff wI = vI
and M,wI |= ϕ .
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we extended two existing approaches (the first one is a logical modeling of short-term and
long-term memories in Intelligent Resource-Bounded Agents, the second one is a logical framework for
reasoning about agents cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type) by introducing a
time module based on a T function, which manages the time interval when an atom is true. With regard to
complexity the T function does not interfere with the ’host’ so the overall complexity remains the same
for both DLEK and DLCA. Future developments could be the extension to other logical frameworks to
prove that we can use this time module in virtually every context.
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